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
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Connie M. Anderson, Bar No. 210286 Philip W. Vineyard, Bar No. 233628 Pouya B. Chami, Bar No. 262965 KLINEDINST PC 777 S. Figueroa St., 47th Floor Los Angeles, California 90017 (213) 607-2115/FAX (213) 607-2116 canderson@klinedinstlaw.com pvineyard@klinedinstlaw.com pchami@klinedinstlaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant David Alan Heslop



#### SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

#### FOR THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE

TWENTY-NINE PALMS BAND OF MISSION INDIANS OF CALIFORNIA; TWENTY-NINE PALMS ENTERPRISES CORPORAITON; and ECHO TRAIL HOLDINGS, LLC, a limited liability company,

Plaintiffs,

V. .

DAVID ALAN HESLOP, an individual, DIVERSIFICATION RESOURCES, LLC, a limited liability company, NATIONAL DEMOGRAPHICS, INC., a corporation, PEGGY SHAMBAUGH, an individual, BENNION & DEVILLE FINE HOMES, INC., doing business as WINDERMERE REAL ESTATE COACHELLA VALLEY, a corporation, and Does 1 through 100,

Defendants.

Case No. RIC 10006101

By Fax

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER RE DEPOSITION OF DAVID ALAN HESLOP; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES AND DECLARATION OF PHILIP W. VINEYARD IN SUPPORT THEREOF

[[PROPOSED] ORDER FILED CONCURRENTLY HEREWITH]

DATE: August 11, 2011 TIME: 8:30 a.m.

DEPT: 2

Judge: Honorable Jacqueline C. Jackson

Dept. 7 – Case Management Purposes

Dept. 2 – Law & Motion

Complaint Filed:

November 7, 2009

Trial Date:

None set

### TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 11, 2011 at 8:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard by the Discovery Referee and/or the Court, Defendant David Alan Heslop ("Heslop") will move the Discovery Referee and/or the Court, pursuant to California

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MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER RE DEPOSITION OF DAVID ALAN HESLOP

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Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420, for a Protective Order requiring Plaintiffs to reasonably accommodate Heslop's and his counsel's schedules for purposes of taking Heslop's deposition. This Motion is based on the following:

- Plaintiffs noticed Heslop's deposition for August 1, 2011, or anytime within a week thereof, but Heslop is unavailable due to family obligations, as is his criminal defense attorney, who plans on attending the deposition, but cannot do so within Plaintiffs' demanded time;
- Heslop provided the first week of September 2011 for his appearance at deposition, and his counsel communicated those dates to all other parties' counsel;
- As widely published in this matter, a Grand Jury and FBI investigation have been instituted to discover whether any criminal wrongdoing arose out of Plaintiffs' allegations in this civil litigation. Due to this contingency, and as explained on numerous occasions to all parties, Heslop currently intends to invoke his Fifth Amendment Right in response to any substantive discovery, including deposition, related to the matters asserted in this litigation.
- Notwithstanding Heslop's intention to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights at deposition and his offer to appear in September, Plaintiffs' counsel insists the deposition proceed on August 1, 2011; and
- No trial date has been set in this matter; therefore, Plaintiffs do not incur any prejudice in taking Heslop's deposition at a date and time convenient to him and his attorneys and only one month later than initially noticed.

Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.010, et seq., and 2025.420, Heslop also requests the Discovery Referee and/or the Court to impose upon Plaintiffs sanctions in the amount of \$2,065 for failure to reasonably accommodate Heslop and his attorneys, as well as to compensate Heslop for the time and costs expended in the preparation of this Motion and in his good faith efforts to meet and confer on mutually agreeable deposition dates. Heslop also requests that Plaintiffs be deemed responsible for the Discovery Referee's time and expense in

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MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER RE

this matter.

DATED: July 11, 2011

This Motion is based upon this Notice of Motion and Motion, the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and the Declaration of Philip W. Vineyard and all other papers filed in support of Heslop's Motion, and such further documentary evidence and oral argument that may be considered at the hearing of this Motion.

KLINEDINST PC

Connie M. Anderson Philip W. Vineyard Pouya B. Chami Attorneys for Defendant

David Alan Heslop

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MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER RE DEPOSITION OF DAVID ALAN HESLOP

#### **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

I.

#### INTRODUCTION

Here we go again. And once again, it is Plaintiffs' continuing lack of reasonability that got us here. On June 10, the Court loosed Plaintiffs from the discovery stay theretofore in place as to David Alan Heslop. That stay had been instituted because the Court was informed a criminal investigation had begun concerning Plaintiffs' allegations in this lawsuit. However, because Department 7¹ of the Riverside Superior Court wanted to move toward a trial date, it had to lift the stay so that the case could be transferred to a trial department, which is responsible for scheduling trial. With the stay lifted, Plaintiffs noticed Heslop's deposition and wrote to his counsel that they were willing to move the deposition within a week on either side of August 1, but would budge no farther – this despite the fact that there is no trial date for this litigation. (See Vineyard Decl., Exhs. A and D.)

On July 7, 2011, Heslop's counsel notified all parties that Heslop was unavailable for deposition in the timeframe demanded by Plaintiffs. (See Vineyard Decl., Exh. B.) After a recitation of why an early deposition of Heslop would likely be fruitless and a waste of everyone's time and money (due to the impending invocation of Heslop's Fifth Amendment rights), Heslop nonetheless offered to appear for deposition in the first week of September. While true Heslop's counsel did not disclose why Heslop was unavailable (and need not given the reason), suffice it to say that Heslop, who is elderly, has familial obligations to which to attend. (Vineyard Decl., ¶5.) That is, however, immaterial. Heslop has offered to appear in September. (Exh. B, supra.) What prejudice Plaintiffs suffer by waiting one month to depose Heslop, especially in view that no trial date exists, is a mystery.

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DEPOSITION OF DAVID ALAN HESLOP

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Department 7 is charged with case management pending assignment of litigation to trial departments,

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#### II.

#### **ARGUMENT**

"A foundational purpose of the Civil Discovery Act is to avoid gamesmanship in litigation." Murillo v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 4th 730, 739 (2006)(citing Emerson Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 1101, 1107 (1997)). Given Plaintiffs' history in both the pleadings and discovery stages, "gamesmanship" seems to be the only strategy they intend to employ. California Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420 permits the Court, upon a showing of good cause, to issue a protective order to ensure a party deponent is not the subject of unwarranted annoyance or undue burden or expense. Subsection (b) to section 2025.420 enumerates the possible forms of the protective order, the first two of which including an order that the deposition not be taken at all and the deposition be taken at a different time. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.420(b)(1) and (2).

Heslop is not trying to avoid a deposition; indeed, he has offered the first week of September to appear. His request to the Discovery Referee and/or the Court is to require Plaintiffs to notice the deposition in the provided timeframe, and to assist in the process, Heslop offers September 1, 6, and 9 for purposes of taking his deposition. If Plaintiffs are unable to work out a deposition in the first week of September, Heslop stands ready to cooperate on future dates. Since the parties have yet to receive notice of which trial department they are to be assigned, there is no need to force a deposition date on any party when that date might conflict with other calendared events. Simply, with no trial date set, Plaintiffs can show no prejudice in permitting Heslop to attend to his familial obligations. Furthermore, the prejudice falls on Heslop if he is forced to appear at an August deposition, without his criminal defense attorney, when the questions to be asked relate directly to the investigation now pending against the many defendants in this action. (Vineyard Decl., ¶6.)

Heslop is informed and believes that Plaintiffs precipitated the FBI and Grand Jury investigation into the various allegations made in Plaintiffs' complaint. Indeed, when Heslop attempted to confirm this fact through Requests for Admissions, Plaintiffs purposely did not respond, instead relying on the mysterious and meritless objection of "invades the province of

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law enforcement." Because there is an ongoing criminal investigation, Heslop has little choice but to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights to any form of substantive discovery that could be used against him in a criminal proceeding. Relevant to this Motion, Heslop's counsel has explained to all parties how wasteful it would be to proceed with Heslop's deposition while the criminal investigation continues, because an invocation of Heslop's Fifth Amendment rights would be forthcoming. (See Vineyard Decl., Exhibit C, p. 2.) Nonetheless, Plaintiffs continue to insist that Heslop appear on the August 1 deposition date. Plaintiffs' decision further highlights their lack of reasonability in prosecuting this matter.

Plaintiffs will try to argue that the case is nearly two years old and that they must be able to work up their case now that the discovery stay as to Heslop has been lifted. Again, this argument might have more teeth if a trial date were pending in the instant action, but it is not, so the delays of the past (e.g., Plaintiffs initially filing their lawsuit in the wrong venue, the aforementioned stay as to Heslop due to the pending Grand Jury investigation, and Plaintiffs' continuing efforts to avoid their own discovery responsibilities) are of no consequence in the instant Motion. What is truly at work, and which Plaintiffs will be quiet about, is that the related legal malpractice action<sup>2</sup> is proceeding toward trial, and they would like to use Heslop's testimony for the matters being pursued in Orange County. Had Plaintiffs not so vigorously fought the Motion to Consolidate and Coordinate the Orange County action with the instant action, they would not be in the bind in which they find themselves currently. Nonetheless, any prejudice Plaintiffs might be facing in Orange County has no determinative value on the merits of Heslop's very reasonable request to move his deposition to the first week of September.

III.

#### CONCLUSION

For all of the forgoing reasons, Heslop respectfully requests the Discovery Referee and/or the Court to order Plaintiffs to accommodate Heslop's reasonable scheduling requests by

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Twenty-Nine Palms Band of Mission Indians of California, et al., v. Nada L. Edwards, et al., assigned case number 30-2009 00311045 by the Superior Court for the State of California, County of Orange. Very early in the Orange County proceeding, the parties attempted to consolidate the two actions, but those efforts were denied by the then-presiding judge.

Klinedinst PC 777 S. Figueroa St., 47th Floor Los Angeles, California 90017 noticing his deposition for the offered dates in September. If Plaintiffs are unable to appear on the offered dates, Heslop requests the Discovery Referee and/or the Court to order Plaintiffs to meet and confer with Heslop's counsel to arrive at a mutually agreeable deposition date. Finally, Heslop respectfully requests the Discovery Referee and/or the Court to impose sanctions against Plaintiffs and its counsel in the amount of \$2,065, to be paid to Heslop by a date deemed suitable by this court. Plaintiffs should also be held responsible for the Discovery Referee's costs related to his efforts in this Motion, and Heslop specifically requests that they be ordered to do so.

DATED: July 11, 2011

KLINEDINST PC

By:

Connie M. Anderson Philip W. Vineyard Pouya B. Chami

Attorneys for Defendant David Alan Heslop

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MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER RE DEPOSITION OF DAVID ALAN HESLOP

1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 I declare that: 3 I am and was at the time of service of the papers herein, over the age of eighteen (18) years and am not a party to the action. I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, and my 4 business address is 777 S. Figueroa St., 47th Floor, Los Angeles, California. 5 On July 11, 2011, I caused to be served the following documents: 6 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER RE DEPOSITION OF DAVID ALAN HESLOP; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES AND 7 DECLARATION OF PHILIP W. VINEYARD IN SUPPORT THEREOF; PROPOSED ORDER 8 VIA FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION: (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1013(e) and (f)): From fax 9 number (213) 607-2116 to the fax numbers listed below and/or on the attached service list. The facsimile machine I used complied with Rule 2008 and no error was reported by KLINEDINST PC 777 S. FIGUEROA ST., 47TH FLOOR LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017 10 the machine. 11 X VIA MAIL: By placing a copy thereof for delivery in a separate envelope addressed to each addressee, respectively, as follows: 12  $\times$ BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL (Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 1013 and 1013(a)) 13 BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1013(c) and (d)) 14 BY CERTIFIED RETURN RECEIPT MAIL (Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 1013 and 15 1013(a)) 16 SEE ATTACHED SERVICE 17 I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, it would be deposited with the United States Postal Service on 18 that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California, in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if 19 postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. 20 21 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the 22 foregoing is true and correct. 23 Executed on July 11, 2011, at Los Angeles, California 24 25 Iudi Chitas 26 27 28

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MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER RE DEPOSITION OF DAVID ALAN HESLOP

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KLINEDINST PC 777 S. FIGUEROA ST., 47TH FLOOR LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017	3	Gordon E. Bosserman, Esq. SPOLIN SILVERMAN COHEN & BOSSERMAN LLP  Attorneys for Plaintiffs:
	4	11601 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2410 Los Angeles, CA 90025 Twenty-Nine Palms Band of Mission Indians of California; Twenty-Nine Palms
	5 6	Enterprises Corporation; and Echo Trail Holdings, LLC, a limited liability company
	7	Telephone: (310) 586-2413
	8	Facsimile: (310) 586-2444
	9	E-mail: reception@sposilco.com
	10	Chard Davidson Fag
	11	Cheryl Davidson, Esq. SUNDERLAND MCCUTCHAN LLP Defendants:
	12	11770 Bernardo Plaza Ct., Suite 250   Peggy Shambaugh; Bennion & Deville Fine   Homes, Inc., dba Windermere Real Estate   Coachella Valley, a corporation
	13	Telephone: (858) 618-1652
	14	Facsimile: (858) 675-7807
	15	
	16	Todd E. Croutch, Esq. Daniel Dik, Esq.  Defendants:
		FONDA & FRASER LLP 100 West Broadway, Suite 650  National Demographics, Inc., a corporation
	17	Glendale, CA 91210-1201 Telephone: (818) 543-1380
	18	Facsimile: (818) 543-1389
	19	Diversification Resources LLC 74090 El Paseo, 2 <sup>nd</sup> Floor
	20	Palm Desert, CA 92260
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