ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR. 1 United States Attorney ROBERT E. DUGDALE Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Criminal Division BRANDON D. FOX (Cal. Bar No. 290409) Assistant United States Attorney Deputy Chief, Public Corruption & Civil Rights Section MEGHAN A. BLANCO (Cal. Bar No. 238171) 5 Assistant United States Attorney Public Corruption & Civil Rights Section 6 1300 United States Courthouse 7 312 North Spring Street Los Angeles, California 90012 (213) 894-0284/2253 Telephone: 8 Facsimile: (213) 894-6436 E-mail: Brandon.Fox@usdoj.gov 9 Meghan.Blanco@usdoj.gov 10 Attorneys for Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 11 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1.3 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. CR 12-441(A)-MWF15 STIPULATION REGARDING REQUEST FOR Plaintiff, (1) CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL DATE AND 16 (2) FINDINGS OF EXCLUDABLE TIME v. PERIODS PURSUANT TO SPEEDY TRIAL 17 ACT FOR DEFENDANT PEGGY ANNE GARY EDWARD KOVALL, and PEGGY ANNE SHAMBAUGH, SHAMBAUGH 18 Defendants. CURRENT TRIAL DATE: 03-11-2014 19 [PROPOSED] TRIAL DATE: 06-02-2014 20 21 Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel 22 of record, the United States Attorney for the Central District of 23 California and Assistant United States Attorneys Brandon D. Fox and 2.4 Meghan A. Blanco, and defendant Peggy Anne Shambaugh ("defendant"), 25 by and through her counsel of record, Matthew Horeczko, hereby 26 stipulate as follows: 27

- 1. The Indictment in this case was filed on May 9, 2012.

 Defendants first appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which the charges in this case were pending on May 11, 2012. The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 originally required that the trial commence on or before July 20, 2012.
 - 2. Defendant is released on bond pending trial.
- 3. The Court has previously continued the trial date in this case to March 11, 2014, and found the interim period to be excluded in computing the time within which the trial must commence, pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act.
- 4. This Court held a status conference in this matter on March 10, 2014. At that conference, at the request of defendant, the Court continued the trial date to allow pretrial services to determine defendant's suitability for pretrial diversion.
- 5. The parties request the continuance based upon the following facts, which the parties believe demonstrate good cause to support the appropriate findings under the Speedy Trial Act:
- a. Defendant is charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 (conspiracy) and 666(a)(1)(B) (bribery of an Indian tribal government receiving federal funds). The government has produced discovery to the defense, including tens of thousands of documents consisting of investigative reports, pleadings from multiple civil cases, bank records, summary charts, photographs, resolutions, contracts, and tribal minutes.
- b. The government has requested that defendant be evaluated by the United States Pretrial Services Office ("PSO") to determine her suitability for pretrial diversion. On March 5, 2014,

the PSO advised the government that it would need approximately 60 days to complete defendant's diversion paperwork for the Court.

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- c. In light of the foregoing, counsel for defendant represents that additional time is necessary to confer with defendant, conduct and complete an independent investigation of the case, and allow the PSO sufficient time to evaluate defendant's suitability for diversion. Defense counsel for defendant represents that failure to grant the continuance would deny him reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
- d. Defendant believes that failure to grant the continuance will deny her continuity of counsel and adequate representation.
 - e. The government does not object to the continuance.
- of the Court's calendar, lack of diligent preparation on the part of the attorney for the government or the defense, or failure on the part of the attorney for the Government to obtain available witnesses.
- 6. For purposes of computing the date under the Speedy Trial Act by which defendant's trial must commence, the parties agree that the time period of March 11, 2014 to June 2, 2014, inclusive, should be excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(2), (h)(7)(A), (h)(7)(B)(i), and (h)(7)(B)(iv) because the delay results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request, without government objection, on the basis of the Court's finding that:

 (i) the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and defendant in a speedy trial; (ii) failure

to grant the continuance would be likely to make a continuation of 1 the proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice; 2 3 and (iii) failure to grant the continuance would unreasonably deny defendant continuity of counsel and would deny defense counsel the 4 reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 5 account the exercise of due diligence. 6 Nothing in this stipulation shall preclude a finding that 7 other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional 8 time periods be excluded from the period within which trial must 9 commence. Moreover, the same provisions and/or other provisions of 10 the Speedy Trial Act may in the future authorize the exclusion of 11 additional time periods from the period within which trial must 12 1.3 commence. IT IS SO STIPULATED. 14 Dated: March 24, 2014 15 16 17 18 19 /s/

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ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR. United States Attorney

ROBERT E. DUGDALE Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Criminal Division

BRANDON D. FOX MEGHAN A. BLANCO Assistant United States Attorney

Attorneys for Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA I am Peggy Anne Shambaugh's attorney. I have carefully discussed every part of this stipulation and the continuance of the trial date with my client. I have fully informed my client of her Speedy Trial rights. To my knowledge, my client understands those rights and agrees to waive them. I believe that my client's decision to give up the right to be brought to trial earlier than June 2, 2014 is an informed and voluntary one.

 $\frac{\text{/s/}}{\text{MATTHEW HORECZKO}} \frac{\text{March 24, 2014}}{\text{Date}}$

Attorney for Defendant PEGGY ANNE SHAMBAUGH